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tory package licensing is illegal because it violates the antitrust pro-
hibitions against unlawful tying arrangements.
Since mandatory package licensing creates the possibility that a
patentee may force licensees to take licenses under patents which
the licensee would not otherwise take, and since mandatory package
licensing may be used by a patentee to protect possibly invalid patents,
it is submitted that the blocking-competing patent distinction is a
weak ground for judging the legality of such an arrangement. The
factors of coercion,4s market dominance, 49 price control, 50 and effect
upon competition 5 ' seem to provide sounder bases for determining
whether mandatory package licensing constitutes patent misuse.
JAMES C. TREAOWAY, JR.
DISCIPLINING ATTORNEY
FOR NONPROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
Membership in the bar is a privilege only for those who maintain
good conduct in their professional and private lives.1 When an at-
torney's nonprofessional conduct2 evidences unfitness or a lack of
personal honesty, a basis for discipline
3 has been established.4
The recent case of In re Morris5 involved disciplining an attorney
for misconduct in his private life. A New Mexico statuteo provides,
"The commission of any act contrary to honesty, justice or good mor-
als," is reason for discipline. Morris had been convicted of involun-
tary manslaughter, involving the death of five people, committed
while driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor. An original
"'E.g., Automatic Radio Mfg. Co. v. ,Hazeltine Research Corp., supra note 21.
11E. g., International Salt Co. v. United States, supra note 26.
"0E.g., United States v. Line Material Co., supra note 3o.
"E.g., International Salt Co. v. United States, supra note 26.
:In re Rouss, 221 N.Y. 81, 116 N.E. 782 (1917).
2Disciplinary proceedings may be invoked whenever it becomes necessary for
the protection of the profession, the courts, and the public. In re Moon, 31o S.W.2d
935 (Mo. 1958).
'The sanctions imposed by disciplinary proceedings may be disbarment, sus-
pension, or reprimand. There is generally no prescribed discipline for any particu-
lar type of conduct. Past good character and an attorney's record as a member of
the bar, however, are considered in determining the extent of the sanctions to be
imposed. In re Pinckney, 276 App. Div. 700, 96 N.Y.S.2d 865 (1950).
'In re Williams, 221 Minn. 554, 23 N.V.2d 4 (1946); State ex rel. Neb. State
Bar Ass'n v. Fitzgerald, 165 Neb. 212, 85 NAV.2d 323 (1957); In re Brown, 64 S.D.
87, 264 N.W. 521 (1936).
'397 P.2d 475 (N.M. 1964).
GN.M. Stat. Ann. § 21-2-1(3) (2.04) (Supp. 1963).
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proceeding was brought before the New Mexico Board of Bar Ex-
aminers to suspend Morris' right to practice law. Morris argued that
driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor is only a misde-
meanor, and the fact that the result was unintended does not alter the
nature of the act. Thus, Morris was contending that his act was not
such that could be considered "contrary to honesty, justice or good
morals."
The New Mexico Supreme Court rejected Morris' argument and
held that the offense of involuntary manslaughter, although arising out
of a misdemeanor, was clearly a felony and of such character as to be
considered "contrary to honesty, justice or good morals." The court
indicated that it was difficult to imagine a felony that is not "contrary
to honesty, justice or good morals," although it was not prepared to
declare that disciplinary action is either justified or required in every
case where a felony had been committed. The court stated that moral
turpitude was not a consideration.
Justice Noble, in a dissenting opinion, stated that an act "contrary
to honesty, justice or good morals," meant the same thing as moral
turpitude.
The courts in all states have authority to discipline attorneys for
nonprofessional misconduct.7 Almost every state has some statutory
authority covering the conduct of attorneys.8 These statutes fall into
two categories: those which detail the specific grounds for disciplinary
action,9 and those which make general statements of policy for the
courts to interpret and enforce.' 0 Where there is no statutory authority
the court will rely on its inherent power to regulate the administration
and discipline of its attorney officers."
Wirtually every state gives some statutory authority. Infra note 8. In many of
the statutes professional and nonprofessional misconduct is covered. E.g., Cal. Bus.
&- Prof. Code § 61o6; Md. Ann. Code art. io, § 16 (1957); N.Y. Judiciary Law § 9o .
New Jersey gives its courts authority by constitutional provision. N.J. Const. art. VI,
§ 2(3).
For a compilation of the statutes and rules concerning discipline of attorneys,
see Brand, Bar Associations, Attorneys and Judges 914-1036 (1956), 289-312 (Supp.
1959).
"E.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 32-267 (1956); Iowa Code Ann. § 610.24 (195o); N.C.
Gen. Stat. § 84-28 (1965).
"'E.g., Md. Ann. Code art. 1o, § 16 (1957); N.Y. Judiciary Law § go; Va. Code
Ann. §54-73 (1950).
uln re Cox, 164 Kan. 16o, 188 P.2d 652 (1948); In re Tracy, 197 Minn. 35, 266
N.W. 88 (1936); Barnard's Case, 131 A.2d 630 (N.H. 1957).
The Canons of Professional Ethics of the American Bar Association are not
binding upon the courts, but rather are a guide to the attorney's professional
conduct. In re Mitgang, 385 Ill. 311, 52 N.E.2d 807 (1944).
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In most nonprofessional misconduct cases the ground for discipline
is the commission of a crime,12 the most common ground being a
felony conviction. 13 Under some statutes, discipline is required only
where the felony involves moral turpitude.14 In other statutes moral
turpitude is not an express requirement.' 5 Where an attorney has
been convicted of a misdemeanor many jurisdictions specifically re-
quire disciplinary action only if the misdemeanor involves moral
turpitude.16 A misdemeanor not involving moral turpitude ordinarily
is not thought to reflect upon the attorney's fitness to practice law.' 7
The usual requirement of moral turpitude was not a factor in the
majority's holding in Morriss that involuntary manslaughter was an
act "contrary to honesty, justice or good morals." In the only other
"Disciplinary Comm'n v. Worrell, 201 N.E.2d 330 (Ind. 1964) (passing counterfeit
United States obligations); In re Welansky, 319 Mass. 205, 65 N.E.2d 202 (1946)
(involuntary manslaughter); In re Meyerson, igo Md. 671, 59 A.2d 489 (1948) (pro-
curing abortion); In re Williams, 221 Minn. 554, 23 N.W.2d 4 (1946) (tax evasion);
In re Wright, 248 P.2d io8o (Nev. 1952) (conspiracy); In re Belluscio, 38 N.J. 355,
184 A.ad 864 (1962) (no funds check); In re Devine, 18 N.J. 67, 112 A.2d 726 (1955)
(obtaining money and property by false pretenses); In re Steinberg, 12 App. Div.
2d 331, 211 N.Y.2d 527 (1961) (forgery); In re Patrick, 136 App. Div. 450, 120
N.Y. Supp. ioo6 (191o) (murder); Butler County Bar Ass'n v. Schaeffer, 172 Ohio
St. 165, 174 N.E.2d 103 (1961) (attorney obtained narcotic drugs by using a forged
prescription); In re Bengtson, 230 Ore. 369, 370 P.2d 239 (1962) (embezzlement); In
re Wolfe's Disbarment, 288 Pa. 331, 135 Atl. 732 (1927) (receiving stolen goods);
In re Dalton, 375 P.2d 258 (Wash. x962) (grand larceny).
The misconduct sufficient to warrant discipline may occur while the attorney
is acting in a non-legal occupational capacity. The same standard of conduct is
applicable. State ex rel. The Fla. Bar v. Clements, 131 So. 2d 198 (Fla. 1961) (insur-
ance agent); In re Lynch, 238 S.W.2d 118 (Ky. 1951); State ex rel. Neb. State Bar
Ass'n v. Butterfield, 169 Neb. 119, 98 N.W.2d 714 (1959) (notary); In re Chartoff,
16 App. Div. 2d 277, 227 N.Y.S.2d 578 (1962) (businessman). In only a few instances
has an attorney who was convicted of a crime not been disciplined. In re Rothrock,
16 Cal. 3d 449, 1o6 P.2d 907 (1940); Branch v. State, 99 Fla. 444, 128 So. 487 (1930);
State v. Metcalfe, 204 Iowa 123, 214 N.W. 874 (1927); In re Burch, 73 Ohio App.
97, 54 N.E. 8o3 (1943). It has been noted, however, that discipline will not be war-
ranted in every case where an attorney has violated the law. In re Means, 207 Ore.
638, 298 P.2d 983 (1956).
"Statutory authority generally explicitly provides for disbarment or discipli-
nary action where there is a felony conviction. E.g., Ala. Code tit. 46, § 49 (1958);
Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 6101-02; Minn. Stat. Ann. § 481.15(1) (1958).
"E.g., Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 6ioi; Md. Ann. Code art. io, § 16 (1957).
15Ala. Code tit. 46, § 49(1) (1958); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 84-28(2) (1965); N.Y.
Judiciary Law § go(4).
"'Ala. Code tit. 46, § 49(1) (1958); Alaska Stat. § o8.o8.24o (1962); Cal. Bus. &
Prof. Code. § 61oi; Ga. Code Ann. § 9-5o1i() (1936); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 481.15(1)
(1958).




reported case, In re Welansky,19 where an attorney was disciplined
after having been convicted of involuntary manslaughter, moral
turpitude was not discussed. In Welansky, the attorney-owner of
Boston's Coconut Grove night club, where over 400 people died in a
fire,20 was disbarred for his reckless disregard for the safety and wel-
fare of his patrons. The court stated that although the crime had no
relation to any act of Welansky as a member of the bar, disbarment
was not precluded. The court further stated that discredit might be
cast upon the bar by extra-professional conduct which reveals unfit-
ness to remain in the profession. Since Welansky failed to offer any
evidence to show the crime was not one disclosing unfitness to re-
main at the bar the court decided the question purely on the invol-
untary manslaughter conviction.
Since Welansky it has been argued that involuntary manslaughter
should not be a ground for discipline as a felony.21 The argument is
that an attorney who has been convicted of involuntary manslaughter,
a crime of negligence and not of intent, is not necessarily unfit to prac-
tice law. While the crime evidences disrespect for the law, it is not
clear that it reflects the attorney's unfitness or incompetence so as to
warrant disciplinary action.
22
Whether a particular criminal act involves moral turpitude causes
special difficulty, although moral turpitude is easily defined: "An act
of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private and social duties
which a man owes to his fellow men, or to society in general, con-
trary to the accepted and customary rule of right and duty between
man and men." 2 3 Two prohibition cases, Young v. Edmundson
24
and Bartos v. United States Dist. Court,25 illustrate the difficulty in
applying the phrase as a practical test. In Edmundson, the court held
the possession and sale of intoxicating liquors to involve moral tur-
pitude. Bartos held that the act of an attorney manufacturing beer
in his home for personal use did not involve moral turpitude. With
such an inherently vague criterion the courts have frequently inter-
preted moral turpitude statutes as giving wide discretion in discipli-
nary proceedings.
11'319 Mass. 2o5, 65 N.E.2d 202 (1946).
-"The facts are set forth in Commonwealth v. Welansky, 316 Mass. 383, 55
N.E.2d 902 (1944).
2nSee Note, 52 Colum. L. Rev. 1039, 1049 (1952).
• 1fanslaughter is specifically excluded in several state attorney discipline
statutes. E.g., Ala. Code tit. 46, § 49(1) (1958); Miss. Code Ann. § 8667 (1956).
2Black, Law Dictionary (4 th ed. 1951).
2103 Ore. 243, 204 Pac. 6ig (1922).
-19 F.2d 722 (8th Cir. 1927).
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Presently, the courts appear to be in disagreement concerning the
element of moral turpitude in one particular area, income tax eva-
sion. While uniform in holding that some discipline is necessary, 20
it has not been settled whether moral turpitude is a natural conse-
quence of a tax evasion conviction. The California case of In re
Hallinan27 considered the question of moral turpitude in this con-
nection. Hallinan had been convicted of filing false and fraudulent
income tax returns. A summary disbarment proceeding was brought
against him under the California statute,28 which clearly provided that
an attorney can only be disbarred when the crime for which he had
been convicted involved moral turpitude. The court considered moral
turpitude inherent in any crime where an intent to defraud was pres-
ent. The question thus raised was whether an intent to defraud is an
essential element of willful tax evasion. The court held that it was not
an essential element under the federal statute, and that a conviction
thereunder does not necessarily involve moral turpitude. Although
the court stated that the attorney's conviction did not warrant summary
disbarment on the basis of conviction alone, he still might be guilty
of acts involving moral turpitude, and so the case was referred to
the State Bar to determine whether further proceedings were called
for.
29
Since Hallinan, numerous cases have dealt with the problem of
whether conviction of willful tax evasion, either failure to file or
fraudulent filing, involves moral turpitude. While Hallinan has
been followed in a number of jurisdictions,30 there is still no uniform-
ity and a number of courts hold to the contrary.31 The Supreme
Court of Washington has held that when fraudulent filing is charged
O7For a general discussion of state disciplinary action where an attorney has
been convicted of federal income tax evasion, see Annot., 59 A.L.R.2d 1398 (1958).
2743 Cal. 2d 243, 272 P.2d 768 (1954).
21Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 61oi.
2'Subsequently, the state bar found the facts and circumstances surrounding
the offense to involve moral turpitude. The state bar recommended that Hallinan
be suspended from practice for three years, which was approved by the court. In re
Hallinan, 48 Cal. 2d 52, 307 P.2d 1 (1957).
rePeople ex rel Dunbar v. Fischer, 132 Colo. 131, 287 P.2d 973 (1955) (fraudulent
filing); Baker v. Miller, 236 Ind. 20, 138 N.E.2d 145 (1956) (fraudulent filing, no
showing of moral turpitude); Ford's Case, 102 N.H. 24, 149 A.2d 863 (1959) (failure
to file-no moral turpitude); In re Corcoran, 215 Ore. 660, 337 P.2d 307 (1959) (fail-
ure to file-no moral turpitude).
51In re Teitelbaum, 13 Ill. 2d 586, 15o N.E.2d 873 (1958) (fraudulent conduct re-
sulting in conviction causes connotation of moral turpitude); State ex rel. Neb. State
Bar Ass'n v. Tibbels, 167 Neb. 247, 92 N.W.2d 546 (1958) (failure to file involves mor-
al turpitude); In re Seijas, 52 Wash. 2d 1, 318 P.2d 961 (1957) (fraudulent filing
involves moral turpitude).
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in the indictment, a conviction thereunder would conclusively be a
conviction of crime involving moral turpitude.3 2 When fraud is
charged in the indictment, this view seems preferable. When fraud
is not charged in the indictment, a consideration in the disciplinary
proceeding of the circumstances surrounding the criminal act could
permit a determination of the presence of moral turpitude.
When commission of a crime is the basis for discipline, actual con-
viction is not a condition precedent to the disciplinary proceeding.
3 3
Even though there has been an acquittal in the criminal trial,3 4 a
court is not precluded from disciplining upon a showing of dishonor-
able conduct. 35 The reason is the difference between the burden of
proof in the two actions. Whereas proof beyond a reasonable doubt is
required in the criminal proceeding, only a preponderance of the evi-
dence is necessary in a disciplinary proceeding.3 6 In some courts, a
conviction has been held to be conclusive proof in the disciplinary
proceeding of the commission of the offense,37 whereas in others a
conviction is regarded as only prima facie evidence of commission. 38
Where the conviction has been reversed after the disciplinary action,
the reversal only gives the attorney a right to petition for reinstate-
ment to the bar.3 9 A pardon is not a defense in a subsequent discipli-
nary proceeding on the theory that it does not remove the stigma at-
tached to the conviction.40
The misconduct of an attorney in his private life may make some
disciplinary action necessary or appropriate41 on the theory that good
moral character, frequently a requirement for admittance to the
bar, no longer exists. Offenses which have been held to evince such im-
morality, even without consideration of the criminal character of the
'In re Seijas, 52 Wash. 2d 1, 318 P.2d 961 (1957).
'State Bar v. Hartford, 282 Mich. 124, 275 N.W. 791 (1937).
• Disciplinary proceedings are not criminal actions. In re O'Neill, 184 App. Div.
75, 171 N.Y. Supp. 514 (1918).
3In re Richards, 333 Mo. 907, 63 S.W.2d 672 (1933); In re Chernoff, 344 Pa.
527, 26 A.2d 335 (1942). A similar result has been reached where there was a reversal.
In re Stein, 249 App. Div. 382, 292 N.Y. Supp. 828 (1937).
1MNaloney v. State ex rel. Cypert, 182 Ark. 51o, 32 S.W.2d 423 (193o); In re
Chernoff, 344 Pa. 527, 26 A.2d 335 (1942).
311n re Needham, 364 Ill. 65, 4 N.E.2d 19 (1936); In re Rudd, 31o Ky. 630, 221
6.W.2d 688 (1949).
"'People ex rel. Colo. Bar Ass'n v. Burton, 39 Colo. 164, 88 Pac. 1o63 (19o7);
State v. O'Leary, 207 Wis. 297, 241 N.W. 621 (1932).
Iln re Stein, 249 App. Div. 382, 292 N.Y. Supp. 828 (1937).
10State v. Snyder, 136 Fla. 875, 187 So. 381 (1939); In re Rudd, 31o Ky. 630,
221 S.W.2d 688 (1949); In re Bozarth, 178 Okla. 427, 63 P.2d 726 (1936).
"lPeople ex rel. Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Meyerovitz, 278 Ill. 356, 116 N.E. 189
(1917); In re Mattera, 34 N.J. 259, 168 A.2d 38 (1961).
